CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR

  • Henry Osahon OSAZEVBARU Delta State University
  • Emmanuel Mitaire TARURHOR Delta State University
Keywords: Executive compensation, information asymmetry, analysts’ following, Chief Executive Officer

Abstract

The theoretical paradigm on the principal-agent relationship stipulates that management should use organizational resources in a manner that benefits all parties of the firm. However, the failure of some corporate giants has been traced to the opportunistic behavior of management, wherein managers abuse their power by controlling the release of corporate information to satisfy their own objectives. Corporate governance mechanisms have therefore been suggested as an approach to mitigating managerial opportunism. This study examined the link between corporate governance mechanisms and the mitigation of managerial opportunism through the use of a performance related executive compensation scheme as an aspect of corporate governance, modelling opportunistic behaviour as asymmetric information proxied by analysts following the firm. Using primary data from a sample of 125 randomly selected top executives in Nigerian firms, and applying OLS regression, the paper found that the CEO benefits and bonuses ratio, and executive benefits and bonuses, could reduce managerial opportunism. On the other hand, CEO long-term mix was found to increase opportunistic behaviour contrary to apriori expectation. It is recommended that the CEO benefit ratio and executive bonuses be employed by Nigerian firms to check opportunistic behaviour by management.

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Author Biographies

Henry Osahon OSAZEVBARU, Delta State University

Dr. Henry Osahon OSAZEVBARU obtains a Ph.D. in Business Management from Delta State University, Abraka-Nigeria. He is currently a senior lecturer in Business Administration department of Delta State University, Abraka-Nigeria.

Emmanuel Mitaire TARURHOR, Delta State University

Dr. Emmanuel Mitaire TARURHOR obtains a Ph.D. in Business Management from Delta State University, Abraka-Nigeria. He is currently a senior lecturer and head of department of Business Administration department of Delta State University, Abraka-Nigeria.

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Published
2020-06-19
How to Cite
OSAZEVBARU, H. O., & TARURHOR, E. M. (2020). CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR. Social Science Asia, 6(3), 1-12. Retrieved from https://socialscienceasia.nrct.go.th/index.php/SSAsia/article/view/193
Section
Research Article